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Abstract
In mid-2007 the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp near Tripoli 
was destroyed by the Lebanese Army battling an insurgent 
Islamist group, Fatah al-Islam. Displacing about 30,000 
Palestinian refugees, it was one of the largest internal bat-
tles in post–civil war Lebanon. A decade later, the camp has 
yet to be fully rebuilt; indeed, reconstruction has been slow, 
conflictual, and underfunded. Rebuilding the camp has 
been contested and delayed by political opposition, fund-
ing shortfalls, and complex ownership of land and property. 
About half of the displaced families have been able to return, 
the remainder are internally displaced, living temporarily 
in other camps or rented apartments. This article analyzes 
the slow-paced reconstruction of the Nahr al-Bared camp 
and especially what can be learnt from rehousing refugees 
in a militarized space of exception.
Résumé
À la mi-2007, le camp de réfugiés de Nahr al-Bared a été 
détruit par l’armée libanaise alors qu’elle combattait Fatah 
al-Islam, un groupe de rebelles islamistes. Ce conflit, l’un des 
conflits internes les plus importants après la guerre civile 
libanaise, a déplacé environ 30 000 réfugiés palestiniens. 
Dix ans plus tard, le camp reste encore à reconstruire entiè-
rement ; en réalité, sa reconstruction est lente, conflictuelle 
et insuffisamment financée. Cette reconstruction est contes-
tée et retardée par une opposition politique, par un manque 
de fonds, et par des problèmes complexes de propriété fon-
cière et patrimoniale. Aujourd’hui, environ la moitié des 
familles déplacées ont pu retourner au camp, l’autre moitié 
restant déplacée à l’intérieur du pays, vivant de manière 
temporaire dans d’autres camps ou dans des appartements 
loués. Cet article analyse la lente reconstruction du camp de 
Nahr al-Bared, et tout particulièrement les enseignements 
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qui peuvent être tirés quant au relogement des réfugiés dans 
un espace militarisé d’exception.
Introduction
On 20 May 2007, after weeks of minor skirmishes, heavy fighting broke out between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam, a militant Islamist group 
that had infiltrated the Nahr al-Bared camp near Tripoli 
(figure 1). After fifteen weeks of intense bombardment and 
gunfire, the camp was reduced to rubble and the death toll 
had reached 500, including around 226 militants and 179 
soldiers.1 At least 50 civilians were also killed in the bloody 
standoff that forced the camp’s 30,000 residents to flee, most 
of them to the Beddawi refugee camp located ten kilometres 
to the south, doubling the camp’s population. This was one of 
the biggest internal conflict events since end of the civil war 
in 1990. Following in the wake of nationwide political crises—
the 2005 assassination of former premier Rafik Hariri and the 
2006 July War with Israel—the battle turned into a proxy war 
between pro-Syrian and pro-Western government blocs.2 
Cautious of being drawn into an urban street fight in the 
alleyways of the camp, the army resorted to mortar fire and 
aerial bombardment of the camp.3 The sustained bombing 
accounted for the enormous physical destruction of the Nahr 
al-Bared camp.4 Almost 6,000 residential and commercial 
units were damaged or destroyed, as was the camp’s rudimen-
tary infrastructure: electricity, water, and sewage.5 The army’s 
siege trapped civilians inside the camp, ignoring calls for a 
truce by humanitarian groups. The last civilians were evacu-
ated from the camp in late August, more than two months after 
the battle began. In September, after more than one hundred 
days of sustained bombing, the last Fatah al-Islam fighters 
were defeated and the remaining 215 militiamen taken into 
custody.6 Palestinian officials from Hamas and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) differed in their response to the 
army’s siege of the camp but, fearing reprisals against the refu-
gees, chose to protect the residents at the expense of the camp.7 
Lacking protection from political patrons, the camp could be 
destroyed without consequence. The Nahr al-Bared residents 
were a marginal and isolated minority that could be marked 
out as disposable; indeed, only in a refugee camp would a 
humanitarian disaster be hailed as a victory.8 
 One of the first refugee camps to be established by the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu-
gees in the Near East (UNRWA), the tiny Nahr al-Bared camp 
began in 1949 as a tented settlement that later was replaced 
by breeze-bloc sheds and houses (figure 2). By the 1950s, 
Nahr al-Bared was one of fifteen official refugee camps,9 
which were later reduced to twelve when three ruined camps 
were not rebuilt after the civil war (1975–90).
In 1983 the Nahr al-Bared camp was destroyed by inter-
factional battles, but there was no concerted post-war effort 
to rebuild the camp or other camps, and they were hap-
hazardly rebuilt as money and resources allowed.10 In 1986 
the Shatila refugee camp in south Beirut was ruined by the 
factional infighting that became known as the “War of the 
Camps.” The destitute residents were given individual grants 
for reconstruction, but without any plan or coordinating 
body to steer reconstruction.11 Unplanned and underfunded 
reconstruction has made refugee camps like Shatila remain 
overcrowded slums,12 without proper sewage, water, and 
electricity infrastructure.13 There is no historical precedent 
for the systematic rebuilding of refugee camps destroyed by 
war in Lebanon. 
Programs that seek to refurbish, upgrade, or improve 
dilapidated Palestinian refugee camps are typically met 
with suspicion, as they are seen as a potential threat to the 
refugees’ “right of return [to Palestine]” as attested by case 
studies from the Jordan valley and Syria.14 This problem 
becomes even more acute when a refugee camp is not only 
upgraded, but rebuilt after being purposively destroyed. 
An example is Linda Tabar’s study of the rebuilding of the 
West Bank Jenin refugee camp ravaged by Israeli bulldozers 
in 2002.15 The reconstruction of Jenin’s ruined centre and 
rebuilding the 500 destroyed houses took three years and 
was contested among residents in the camp and vis-à-vis 
UNRWA. The camp’s stakeholder committee wanted to rebuild 
the camp “as it was” and it was adamant that the new access 
roads should replicate the narrow streets of the old centre 
as a means of community protection. This demand brought 
the committee into conflict with UNRWA planners, who 
argued that narrow roads were neither feasible nor desir-
able. UNRWA’s vision for unhindered vehicular access was 
shared by other residents viewing wide access roads as pref-
erable, despite legitimate security concerns. The disagree-
ment delayed planning and divided residents. In the end, the 
committee was sidelined, and the proponents were branded 
“emotional,” “self-interested,” and therefore “political,” as 
opposed to UNRWA’s masterplan cast as neutral and univer-
sal.16 UNRWA pushed through with the plan for seven-metre 
roads, almost twice the maximum demanded by the com-
mittee and three times wider than the pedestrian footpaths. 
The contested reconstruction of the Jenin camp prefigured 
UNRWA’s Camp Improvement Program, which was inaugu-
rated in 2006 and aimed at “improving living conditions in 
houses and camps through a systematic and participatory 
approach.”17 The new program incorporated lessons from 
Jenin (West Bank) and Neirab (Syria) and marked a transi-
tion from relief to development. The new program replaced 
UNRWA’s outdated housing and shelter standards with a new 
policy that ruined homes should be rebuilt on the basis of 
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what was lost.18 Nonetheless, camp upgrading and improve-
ment programs continued to stir conflict, amidst internal 
divisions and claims of elite hijacking of projects.19 
Exceptionality of Camps
In recent years the works of Giorgio Agamben have attracted 
attention to the unique governance issues that produce 
Figure 1. Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, inset map of Lebanon 
© ICG. Reproduced with permission from International Crisis Group, Middle East Report, no. 117, 1 March 2012. https://d2071andvip0wj 
.cloudfront.net/117-lebanon-s-palestinian-dilemma-the-struggle-over-nahr-al-bared.pdf.
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refugee camps as “spaces of exception” and turn resident 
refugees into disposable subalterns (“bare life”).20 Despite 
the emerging critique of Agamben21 and the sometimes 
simplified and over-determined use of his key concepts, 
in Lebanon his work has been used to deconstruct camp 
governance,22 detainment refugees and wholesale destroy 
camps wholesale,23 but not to explain the complex and con-
tested refurbishing and rebuilding of refugee camps. This 
omission is significant, because it is in their reconstruction, 
I contend, that the inherit contradictions of refugee camps 
are most glaring. To this end, this article is a contribution to 
the discussion of the exceptionality of refugee camps24 and 
here used to analyze the conditions that make rebuilding 
refugee camps a quagmire. Punitive house demolitions is 
a common form of collective punishment of Palestinians,25 
making analyzing it particularly important for urban plan-
ning, and especially so because of the importance of home 
for exiled Palestinians, captured in the multi-vocal Arabic 
term al-Beit.26 
The exceptionality of refugee camps becomes even more 
glaring when we compare this to the rebuilding of non-camp 
urban and rural neighbourhoods destroyed by war. In mid-
2006, Hizbollah’s cross-border ambush of an Israeli patrol led 
to a month-long military campaign known as the “July War” 
with punitive Israeli air strikes targeting Shia-majority areas 
in South Lebanon and Beirut’s Southern Suburbs (Haret 
Figure 2. Nahr al-Bared, ca. 1960 
© UNRWA. Reproduced with permission by the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA) under licence agreement signed 31 October 2018 
between the author and UNRWA.
Hreik) and wreaking destruction of residential areas (table 
1).27 Within hours of the United Nations brokered ceasefire, 
Hizbollah’s reconstruction wing Jihad al-Bina delivered cash 
grants directly to the affected home-owners in the South, 
soon followed by other Arab and Muslim donors providing 
grants ranging from US$3,000 to US$30,000.28 Providing 
cash grants to affected homeowners played on local senti-
ments where speed and efficiency trumped other concerns.29 
This gave the Arab donors strong popular credibility, unlike 
Western donors favouring a governmental response, which 
was interpreted as propping up the state in a country where 
the government is associated with a slow, wasteful, and cor-
rupt bureaucracy. A reconstruction facilitator rather than 
actor,30 the Government of Lebanon (GoL) paid the least 
and was slowest in disbursing funds.31 In addition to emer-
gency aid and cash grants to the affected villages and home-
owners, the many foreign donors also provided massive 
bilateral support to Lebanon that was chartered both inside 
(Saudi Arabia) and outside government-controlled channels 
(Iran, Jihad al-Bina), reflecting donor agendas and political 
relations vis-à-vis the Government of Lebanon (GoL).32 
The importance of rapid rebuilding and rehousing of 
residents was also key to Hizbollah’s reconstruction in Bei-
rut’s Haret Hreik neighbourhood where 20,000 destitute 
homeowners (malikeen) were rehoused by Wa‘ad, a sub-
sidiary of Hizbollah’s reconstruction agency (Jihad al-Bina) 
tasked with planning the reconstruction of Haret Hreik. A 
not-for-profit NGO, Wa‘ad was named after General Secre-
tary Hassan Nasrallah’s “solemn promise” (Wa‘ad al-Sadiq) 
to rebuild homes “more beautiful than before.” As the legal 
representative of the homeowners,33 Wa‘ad collected the 
government compensation funds on their behalf, disregard-
ing calls from urban planners to provide more public space 
that would delay the reconstruction,34 rebuilt the 300 multi-
story houses as pre-war replicas within five years (table 1).35 
To this end the design, planning, and reconstruction were 
chartered outside state channels and made the Hizbollah an 
“urban planner.”36 
In little more than two years (2006–8), almost two-thirds 
of the buildings damaged or destroyed in South Lebanon 
had been either rehabilitated or rebuilt, and more than 
three-quarters of the displaced had returned home (table 1). 
In Haret Hreik the level of destruction and size of displace-
ment was comparable to Nahr al-Bared but covered a much 
larger area;37 reconstruction and rehousing the residents 
was completed in five years (table 1). In 2008 UNRWA esti-
mated that rebuilding the Nahr al-Bared camp would take 
three years,38 but a decade later only half of the destroyed 
homes had been rebuilt and the majority had not returned. 
This comparison demonstrates that UNRWA achieved less in 
ten years than the July War actors in less than half this time 
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(table 1). What are the reasons that rebuilding the tiny Nahr 
al-Bared camp took so long and proved so difficult? 
In this article I argue that the contested Nahr al-Bared 
reconstruction was delayed in response to lessons from the 
July War’s rapid reconstruction and rehousing projects. The 
slow-paced reconstruction took place inside bureaucratic 
governance channels, hence was subject to political bicker-
ing and delays. The design principles were contested, plan-
ning was politicized, and the contractor-driven reconstruc-
tion stewarded by a humanitarian relief agency (UNRWA) 
depended on donations. Blamed for hosting a militant 
Islamist group, the displaced Nahr al-Bared residents were 
not seen as victims but as perpetrators who had allowed a 
militant group to gain a foothold in the camp. This served to 
securitize reconstruction and made the army fill dual roles 
as conflict actor and urban planner. The primary data for 
this article were collected as part of documentary filmmak-
ing during the site clearance and planning phase (2008–9), 
followed by field visits and taped interviews with displaced 
refugees in Nahr al-Bared and Beddawi camps during the 
initial reconstruction phase (2010–11). The ensuing recon-
struction period (2012–17) combines secondary data and 
interviews with UNRWA and PLO officials, local activists, and 
others involved in rebuilding the camp.
Rebuilding Nahr al-Bared?
Today Lebanon is host to twelve official refugee camps under 
management by UNRWA. The Palestinian refugees were 
denied civil rights from the start, and their socio-political 
segregation was manifested by establishing new refugee 
camps in the outskirts of the capital, Beirut, and coastal cities. 
Most camps were located at a distance from urban centres 
and in some cases planned, in other cases built around for-
mer refugee settlements and army barracks.39 The majority 
of the Palestinians have since remained camp based (52 per 
cent)—the highest in the region—a result of non-integrative 
policies to prevent their permanent settlement (tawteen).40
In Lebanon rebuilding refugee camps is especially sensi-
tive, because they embody critical governance issues that pre-
vent their permanent settlement, and sensitive sectarian and 
security issues, which, after 1990, have made camps associ-
ated with lawlessness, expressed in the term “security islands” 
(juzur amniyya, “islands of [self-policed] security”), mean-
ing that they are beyond the reach of Lebanese law, harbour-
ing weapons and sheltering criminals. The refugee camps are 
self-governed and autonomous, and factions inside camps 
are armed—privileges granted in response to plo military 
strength in the period prior to the civil war (1975–90)—
forming a part of the “Cairo Agreement” (1969).41 Attempts 
to repeal these privileges, especially to disarm factions and 
decommission arms, have been unsuccessful, although the 
original Cairo Agreement was abrogated by parliament in 
1987. This means that refugee camps are under multiple, 
competing, and often conflictual governance by the state, 
security agencies, the army, UNRWA, and the camps’ multiple 
leaderships, parties, armed factions, and Palestinian factions 
(“Popular Committees”), giving rise to a system of “hybrid 
sovereignties.”42 The governance of Palestinian refugee 
Table 1. Comparison of conflict events, costs, and reconstruction outcomes, 2007–17a
Conflict 
event 
Reconstruc-
tion period
Pledged 
US$ 
(millions)
Disbursed
US$ 
(millions) 
Residential 
units ruined 
Residential 
units rebuilt IDPs 
Rehoused & 
returned (%)
July War 
(South 
Lebanon)
2006–8 8,500 1,500 b 125,000 80,000 262,000 78
July War 
(Haret Hreik)
2007–12 – 400 c 3,000 3,000 20,000 100
Nahr al-
Bared siege 
2007–17 345 238 d 4,591 2,514 20,000 54
a. Data collated from Al-Harithy (2010), Barakat and Zyck (2010); Barakat (2013); Mac Ginty and Hamieh (2010); GoL (2008); Hourani (2015); UNRWA.org 
(2017); UNRWA (2018).
b. Arab and Muslim donors (US$622 million), GoL (US$293 million), Jihad al-Bina (US$600 million).
c. The homeowners were paid US$50,000 each, plus additional compensation for “common areas” (US$30,000). Support from Jihad al-Bina other 
donors (Iran) accounted for the rest.
d. Of the twenty-seven donors, the three largest are United States (US$85 million), Saudi Arabia (US$50 million) and EU (US$41 million). The Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) donated US$2.2 million, which is higher than the median donor support.
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camps depends on their history and location. The northern 
camps, especially those clustered around Tripoli, such as 
Beddawi and Nahr al-Bared, were traditionally under Syr-
ian stewardship following the defeat and evacuation of PLO 
forces from North Lebanon in 1982.43 Until 2007 Nahr al-
Bared was the most open, peaceful, and prosperous camp in 
the country and enjoyed close relations with neighbouring 
communities through its role as a central marketplace, with 
a large informal economy, cheap labour, goods, and services, 
as well as close to the highway connecting the rural Akkar 
region with Tripoli, the regional capital.
The 2007 siege and destruction of Nahr al-Bared, the first 
during peacetime, was a turning point in the state’s relation 
with Palestinian refugees that had steadily improved following 
the creation of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee 
(LPDC) in 2005, a ministerial committee to manage refugee 
affairs.44 The Nahr al-Bared disaster was a political setback 
that verified long-held claims that the refugee camps are a 
security threat and shelters militant groups operating under 
foreign command. Rebuilding the camp also challenged the 
official policy of preventing permanent settlement of refugees 
in Lebanon, and was important enough to be inscribed into 
the Taif Agreement that ended the civil war, as well as in the 
preamble to the Lebanese constitution. The government and 
refugees reject “settlement” in Lebanon, but the camp’s recon-
struction involves refugees being “re-settled,” with the conno-
tation of implantation, and that is why groups in government 
opposed reconstruction and sought to delay it.45 
The government was adamant that the new camp should 
not become a base for militant groups again. To this end, the 
rebuilt camp would not be administered by Popular Com-
mittees, as in most refugee camps, but, for the first time, 
be a Lebanese-administered camp controlled by the army. 
The plan involved construction of an army and naval base 
with a staff of about one thousand men stationed inside the 
camp perimeters (figure 3). The army’s plan for community 
policing was rejected by the residents,46 seen as proof of 
the strict security regime to be enforced in the rebuilding 
of Nahr al-Bared—in official parlance a “model” that could 
be expanded to include other camps.47 This would not only 
open the thorny issue of autonomy and camp governance 
but was also seen as a return to the 1960s control of refu-
gee camps by the army intelligence agency, the “Deuxième 
Bureau,”48 and make the army the camp’s final arbiter. 
Almost fifty donors contributed to the early relief and 
recovery phase costing close to US$125 million (2007–11), but 
UNRWA, which was responsible for the humanitarian assis-
tance to the displaced refugees, struggled to maintain ade-
quate support.49 Rebuilding the camp and its infrastructure 
is costly and complex, comparable to constructing a mid-
sized town. In 2008 Lebanon organized a donor conference 
in Vienna to raise money for rebuilding the camp.50 Since 
then the costs of reconstructing have continued to rise and 
now stand at US$345 million if pre-construction operations 
are included. An additional US$116 million is needed to 
rehabilitate adjacent (non-refugee) municipalities damaged 
during the army siege, bringing the total sum to around 
US$450 million. By mid-2013 the twenty-eight donors had 
disbursed US$171 million, including a multi-donor trust 
fund, leaving more than US$150 million for the camp’s 
reconstruction.51 When completed the Nahr al-Bared camp 
would be one of UNRWAs largest rebuilding projects outside 
Palestine and Gaza. During previous camp disasters, one of 
the destroyed camps was not rebuilt.52 Among the refugees, 
there was suspicion that this camp too would not be rebuilt 
for lack of money and political opposition, especially from 
Maronite groups objecting to the Palestinian presence in the 
country.53 Despite government assurances to the contrary, 
refugees distrusted the pledge to rebuild the camp. The 
lingering uncertainty was made worse by subjecting those 
allowed to return to their homes in the ruined camp to a 
security regime that was stricter than that applied to the 
unruly camps in the south. 
Cordoning the Camp
From late 2007, the ruined Nahr al-Bared camp was cordoned 
off with a wire fence interspersed by five army checkpoints 
(figure 3). To enter the camp, all residents above the age of 
thirteen had to carry an identity card and hold a residency 
permit. The residency permits were issued at the discretion 
of the army’s Directorate of Military Intelligence and could 
be denied or left pending without reason and subject to 
change without prior notice at the discretion of army per-
sonnel.54 Non-resident refugees could obtain visitor permits 
following a similar procedure. Additional permits, so-called 
work permits, were needed to access specific sections of the 
camp, the destroyed Old Camp, and the so-called Adjacent 
Area (“New Camp”). The permit system was premised on the 
fact that although the army’s siege ended in September 2007, 
the camp has since been a de facto military zone, a measure 
that according to the Lebanese constitution (article 65, para-
graph 5) requires a cabinet decree followed by parliament 
approval. Even though no such approval exists, the camp 
will be managed a designated military zone until reconstruc-
tion is finished.55
The residents were routinely harassed at checkpoints and 
their personal belongings scrutinized. The security regime 
made living in the camp so difficult that residents despaired 
and felt demonized. In the words of a local activist, “Why are 
they treating us like terrorists; why, why?”56 He had earlier 
been arrested and detained after criticizing the army’s heavy-
handed security in a TV newscast. He was released two days 
Volume 34 Refuge Number 2
141
later, on condition that the interview was deleted, yet he con-
tinued to face harassment and intimidation. Another contact 
had similarly been detained after writing a critique in a local 
daily of the army’s role in cordoning the camp. These exam-
ples underline the strict security that applied to the camp 
and the harassment of those criticizing the army’s post-con-
flict role. These restrictions are significant because the army 
is one of Lebanon’s most trusted public institutions, and in 
carefully protecting its neutrality it avoids taking sides in 
conflicts.57 However, sensitive to its public image, the army 
silenced the critique of the siege of Nahr al-Bared, further-
ing government “obsession with security,” which slowed the 
camp’s reconstruction.58 
At the time, most of the camp’s residents were displaced 
and living in makeshift shelters or shared and rented rooms. 
The few who had been allowed to return were forced into 
debt to repair their homes or to rent temporary housing. The 
worst off were the about 1,000 persons languishing in tempo-
rary shelters—“metal housing units” measuring only eight-
een square metres—without air-conditioning stacked on the 
edge of the camp, appropriately nicknamed “Guantanamo 2.” 
Hot, humid, and drab, the shelters are filled with tired and 
depressed adults, wide-eyed youngsters, and bored youth 
killing time playing cards.59 Nahr al-Bared had become a 
hyperghetto where the residents suffered from strict surveil-
lance and segregation in what could be called a “permanent 
state of emergency.”60 The displaced refugees were adamant 
that the army’s target was not Fatah al-Islam but getting even 
with the refugees believed to be complicit in hiding, sup-
porting, and abetting the militants. The real target was the 
refugees themselves, not Fatah al-Islam. Ruining the camp 
was a collective punishment of the refugees, not a military 
tactic dictated by the need to confront Fatah al-Islam.
Figure 3. Nahr al-Bared: Security measures and military bases, 2009
Reproduced under licence CC BY NC ND 3.0, https://kharita.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/nahr-el-bared.pdf.
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For the first-generation Palestinian refugees who lost 
their home and property in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, com-
monly referred to as the disaster (al-Nakba), the loss is even 
deeper. The Nahr al-Bared destruction is interpreted as a 
second disaster. Many of the first- and second-generation 
refugees living in Nahr al-Bared have experienced repeated 
war and displacement. The attack on the camp brought back 
painful civil war memories: the destruction and flight from 
the Tell al-Zatar refugee camp (1976), the massacres in Sabra 
and Shatila (1982), and the brutal War of the Camps (1985–7). 
The destruction of the Nahr al-Bared camp was therefore 
seen as a continuation of the attack on Palestinians in Leba-
non facing decades of legal discrimination, marginalization, 
and repeated displacement.61 In the words of a young Pal-
estinian from the camp, “We, the Palestinians, really do not 
have any rights. We are oppressed, but why? Is it because 
we have this blue ID-card? Or because we are refugees? Or 
because we live in camps, in slums [zinco]? But I feel proud 
of being a Palestinian. You and others might hear me, but 
those who should give me my rights are not listening to me. 
They ignore me because I am a Palestinian.”62 
Securitizing Reconstruction
The original master plan for rebuilding the Nahr al-Bared 
camp sought to extend the military’s role in determining the 
layout of the camp’s reconstruction. In order to ease access 
and surveillance, the army wanted Nahr al-Bared rebuilt 
with low-rise apartment blocks separated by streets that 
were ten to fifteen metres wide. This is a securitized model 
of urban planning that breaks with the original camp layout, 
which is modelled on an army camp with barracks.63 Moreo-
ver, the army opposed balconies and banned basements; 
the new houses should have neither because they could be 
used by armed groups.64 In order to prevent the new homes 
from becoming future bases in an armed insurrection, they 
are constructed using a “floating slab foundation,” where 
concrete is poured onto the construction site with minimal 
topsoil removal (figure 4). 
This building technique avoids digging deep into the 
ground, which could potentially harm archaeological 
remains but, more importantly, prevents access to the many 
underground bunkers that were excavated during the civil 
war. The bunkers were one reason why the army took so 
long dislodge Fatah al-Islam. The floating slab foundation 
was chosen to securitize the camp’s reconstruction and pre-
vent the camp from becoming an insurgent base. Hence the 
army sought to transform the camp from a potential “zone 
of outlaws” to a military “zone of security” where the resi-
dents had minimal influence on their urban space. In this 
sense, the army emerged as an urban planner, stewarding 
Figure 4. Floating slab foundation used in reconstructing Nahr 
al-Bared, 2011
© Mahmoud Zeidan, reproduced with permission
reconstruction based on a militarized design that privileges 
security and policing. 
One of the most complex issues for rebuilding the camp, 
in addition to the lack of money, was the complex property 
ownership that surrounds both the plots and individual 
housing units.65 Most residents did not hold formal deeds of 
ownership to their houses or plots. Many of the houses and 
flats had changed owners several times, or absentee owners 
had put flats on long-term lease, but without legally valid 
registration. This is a common practice in Lebanon, reflect-
ing the pervasive informality of the housing and property 
market.66 The 2001 amendment, which barred Palestinian 
refugees from owning or registering property, made the 
process even more difficult and time consuming.67 Addi-
tionally, the destroyed camp is divided into two sections that 
not only reflect the territorial expansion from the original 
UNRWA Old Camp to the adjacent New Camp, but also from 
houses located on land leased by UNRWA, to land where the 
houses are squatting on private and municipal land. Thus, 
complex ownership issues surrounding apartments, housing 
blocs, and plots, and necessitated expropriation of land need 
to be resolved.68 
Participatory Planning? 
In order to counter the original plans for rebuilding the camp 
and establish a baseline for rebuilding houses, a grassroots 
initiative was formed around a young Palestinian architect 
turned activist.69 Initially the upstart Nahr al-Bared Recon-
struction Commission for Civil Action and Studies was 
ignored by the government, UNRWA, and local powerbrokers 
in the camp.70 Undaunted, the commission inserted itself 
squarely into the planning process to document property 
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ownership, influence the reconstruction, and especially chal-
lenge the initial draft for the master plan that would turn 
housing blocs into barracks and alleyways into autostradas. 
The commission surveyed the ruined buildings and, with the 
help of the destitute families, sorted out property ownership 
and drew up detailed plans for individual housing units.71 
More than 150 volunteers helped with “asset-mapping,” using 
large-scale walk-in maps to assist residents with identifying 
their houses and those of their neighbours. This painstak-
ing work included almost 1,700 buildings and was critical 
enough for UNRWA’s Camp Improvement Program (CIP) to 
include the commission in a joint planning and design unit 
comprising four chief architects leading more than eighty 
support staff liaising with the UNRWA hq developing the 
overall design for the camp and individual apartments.72 
After two years of work, more than sixty design meetings with 
officials and submission of twenty-four different versions of 
the master plan, the preliminary plan was finally approved 
by the government in May 2009.73 Says a camp manager, 
“The system was very tightly controlled and demanding, with 
frequent controls and monitoring. All plans, drawings and 
work packages had to be approved and the [the buildings’] 
size and height had to comply with the plan. The Master Plan 
was the ‘red line’ and when agreed to by the army, UNRWA, 
and the government, it had to be adhered to.”
This was the first time UNRWA agreed to work in partner-
ship with a grassroots organization.74 The most important 
part of this participation was to “recreate the social geog-
raphy of the camp, reproducing the original street and 
public space layouts as well as the footprints of the various 
buildings.”75 The urban design was based on the extended 
family unit with mostly three-storied residential blocs,76 
but the master plan reduced the footprint of individual 
housing units by 15–35 per cent to provide more public space 
(increased from 13 to 37 per cent) but also to accommodate 
the army’s demand for wider streets.77 This meant rehousing 
refugees in smaller apartments, with smaller families taking 
the biggest reductions, creating resentment and charges of 
favouritism and corruption.78 
However, before construction could begin, UNRWA had to 
validate the information and ensure that the plan complied 
with national building regulations. The validation process 
alienated the refugees, who were turned from participants 
to clients, with UNRWA reasserting control of the reconstruc-
tion.79 At the same time, the commission began to crumble 
following internal divisions and growing opposition from 
Popular Committees, which ignored it at first, later consid-
ered it a competitor, and finally decided to replace it.80 In 
the spring of 2010 the commission closed operations and the 
main protagonist left. This not only ended the participatory 
planning between the commission and UNRWA’s design unit 
but also made political factions, weakened by loss of author-
ity and trust, the new counterpart in the camp’s reconstruc-
tion. The collapse of the commission was UNRWA’s loss too, 
as the agency no longer benefited from liaising with a politi-
cally independent body.81 
In early 2009, almost two years after the camp’s destruc-
tion, bulldozers finally began removing the rubble and unex-
ploded ordnance that littered what used to be the Old Camp. 
In March an inaugural ceremony was held to mark the lay-
ing of the foundation stone for the new camp. Nonetheless, 
rubble removal was halted after archaeological remains were 
unearthed, only to be restarted a couple of months later. 
Reconstruction continued at a snail’s pace, mostly on tempo-
rary shelters and repairs. In the New Camp that falls outside 
the original camp perimeters under management by UNRWA, 
the majority were still awaiting permission to move back 
to their severely damaged but still habitable homes located 
adjacent to the camp in the “Prime Areas” zoned from A 
through E. The original deadline for completing the camp’s 
reconstruction was in 2011, but by then Nahr al-Bared’s slow 
and erratic reconstruction had caused enormous frustration, 
resentment, and, in the end, public protests and demon-
strations.82 The militarized security regime had made the 
camp one of the most difficult places to live in Lebanon and 
discouraged many from returning. Still, those displaced 
remained emotionally attached to the camp and wanted to 
return: “I don’t know how to express it, but I prefer to live in 
Nahr al-Bared, whatever the situation, even in the presence 
of Lebanese soldiers and security fences.”83 
Rebuilding Camp and Community?
The many delays, false starts, and planning hurdles had made 
people despair and lose faith. In late September 2011, after 
an agonizing four-year wait, the first of eight reconstruction 
“packages,” P1 housing 317 families and three UNRWA schools 
were inaugurated during an official ceremony (figure 5). On 
this occasion, invited guests where whisked past checkpoints 
by courteous army personnel checking IDs and printed invi-
tation cards. Inside the camp, smiling UNRWA employees 
distributed white baseball caps sporting the UNRWA logo 
and provided a lavish, colour portfolio of the Nahr al-Bared 
reconstruction project titled “Peace Starts Here.” The inau-
guration ceremony was held under the patronage of the 
Government of Lebanon and included speeches by ministers, 
UNRWA officials, as well as Palestinian representatives in the 
presence of donors, ambassadors, UNRWA representatives, 
and UNRWA staff seated in the front rows next to the outdoor 
scene erected for the event (figure 5).84 The carefully staged 
event included speeches, appeals, popular song and tradi-
tional dance performances by a Palestinian youth troupe, all 
captured by film crews and journalists. 
Volume 34 Refuge Number 2
144
Next to the podium, activists from the camp’s political fac-
tions held up placards listing demands that the government 
end the permit system, rebuild the remainder of the Old Camp, 
and arrange for UNRWA to fund emergency relief and provide 
temporary shelters (figure 5). To underline the urgency of their 
demands, they chanted impromptu couplets subtly shaming 
the prominent speakers: 
O’ government … where are you, where are you? And the [army’s 
security] permits are in front of your eyes!
O’ government … where are you, where are you? And the [PLO] 
ambassador is in front of your eyes!
O’ the PLO … where are you, where are you? And the eight million 
[dollars promised as funding] are in front of your eyes!85
Behind them a huge poster publicized the event: “Nahr al-
Bared: Rebuilding a Community” (figure 5). Still, the camp’s 
erstwhile community, its residents, was literally offered the 
backseat. Separated from the guests of honour by a green rib-
bon, the rows to the rear had been reserved for them. Only 
a few showed up, not for lack of interest, but because only a 
limited number had been allowed to take part. Aghast, many 
stayed away, feeling snubbed.86 One distraught woman in the 
back rows repeatedly tried to break into the front lines where 
UNRWA officials and invited speakers were seated, only to be 
restrained by army personnel. This division points to much 
deeper tensions between UNRWA’s celebratory inauguration 
ceremony “Rebuilding a Community” and the desperation 
of displaced refugees at the end of their tether. It suggests 
that the “participatory approach” ended when the planning 
phase was completed in 2009 and UNRWA reasserted control 
of reconstruction, reverting to its default central planning 
mode that alienated the displaced refugees.
Contested Reconstruction
Despite completion of the first reconstruction package, the resi-
dents were fed up with the living conditions in the camp and 
suffered from stress, frustration, and anger. In mid-June 2012 
a new round of protests broke out in the camp. At one army 
checkpoint, a quarrel over entry permits led to army guards 
killing a fifteen-year-old boy.87 With the camp’s cemetery 
already filled beyond capacity, burial was impossible within the 
confines of the camp. The next day the victim’s body was taken 
for burial on a piece of land owned by the PLO but controlled by 
the army. When the army intervened to stop the burial, fighting 
broke out and the soldiers on duty, claiming to be under attack, 
fired into the crowd, killing two and injuring twenty.88 These 
incidents sparked countrywide protests and provoked clashes, 
strikes, and sit-ins in support of the victims. The situation in 
the Nahr al-Bared camp long remained tense, with the army 
claiming that it had been “infiltrated” by pro-Syrian elements 
Figure 5. Nahr al-Bared inaugural ceremony (Package 1), 2011
Source: Photograph by the author
seeking to provoke strife and destabilize the country. Later, 
bowing to pressure, the army lifted the camp’s permit system 
from mid-July 2012, but other entry restrictions remain in 
place, and the checkpoints are still manned by the army.89 Says 
an UNRWA camp manager, “The camp is a weapons-free zone, 
but the army is still controlling the camp. Since 2014, the army 
has withdrawn and is less visible, but has a well-developed 
intelligence-gathering system in the camp—they know what is 
going on and pretty much run everything.”90
In mid-2013 reconstruction stalled again amidst new 
funding shortfalls, prompting demonstrations in front of 
UNRWA’s head office in Beirut.91 The fact that only two smaller 
sections (packages) of the Old Camp had been rebuilt by then 
was proof that the reconstruction of the camp was a hoax. 
The contract for clearing the building site and reconstruct 
the camp was first awarded to the Lebanese firm Al-Jihad 
Associates, but after delays and extensive subcontracting, it 
was transferred to another contractor, Danash. Although 
the main contractor is Lebanese, most of the labour force is 
Palestinian.92 For UNRWA, managing the many donors was 
time consuming, with most channelling funds outside the 
multi-donor trust fund set up for the purpose, as was match-
ing them with contractors. In the words of a UNRWA camp 
manager, “In the first phase, we outsourced too much work 
to large contractors which subcontracted the work, resulting 
in poor quality. This gave us a problem and made us lose 
control of the reconstruction.” Following an internal audit 
in 2013–14, UNRWA decided to downsize the reconstruction 
unit, laid off non-essential staff, outsourced less work, and 
gave out only smaller tenders.93 
In 2013 the Nahr el-Bared master plan was shortlisted 
for the prestigious Agha Khan Architecture Award and, a 
year later, nominated for the City-to-City Barcelona award. 
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However, the camp’s urban design had reduced the size of 
homes by one-third on average, to accommodate enlarged 
public space, gardens, wider alleys, and access roads. The 
residents, however, preferred larger homes but had to con-
tend with a net reduction in their living space. Like in camps 
elsewhere in Lebanon, enlargements and adding new top 
floors are prohibited, although the rule is frequently circum-
vented, leaving families without legal options for enlarging 
homes and accommodating new family members.94 After 
ten years, the returning families’ size and composition had 
changed, leaving many dissatisfied with their new homes. 
By October 2015, UNRWA could no longer afford to pay 
rental cash subsidies (US$150) to the close to 2,200 displaced 
families renting temporary premises elsewhere: “The donors 
would no longer provide humanitarian aid almost ten years 
into the post-conflict phase.”95 As foreign funding dwin-
dled, key services were also reduced, especially health care, 
prompting long and angry protests from the refugee commu-
nity, including the closure of construction sites. Between 2013 
and 2015, violent clashes in Tripoli prevented access to the 
camp and further delayed reconstruction. Inside the camp, 
local commerce had not rebounded because army check-
points discouraged traders and customers alike. Reconstruc-
tion had also stalled as the result of funding shortages, with 
about US$100 million needed to finalize the remaining three 
reconstruction packages.96 The massive funding needed for 
the Syrian displacement crises (2012–present) had made 
funding even scarcer, but Lebanon was able to get additional 
funds for the Nahr al-Bared reconstruction (US$50 million) 
as part of the Syria Pledging Conference in London in 2016.97 
In 2016, UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon visited the camp and 
urged donors to fund the camp’s reconstruction,98 but the 
deadline for completion kept being extended. By the end 
of 2017 about half of the housing units had been completed, 
while another 370 housing units were under construction 
(table 1).99 In the words of an UNRWA camp manager, “We 
are committed to rebuild the camp, especially for those 
still living in temporary shelters. We are also bound by the 
Vienna document and our responsibility to the refugee 
community.”100 While the Vienna document put UNRWA in 
charge of the Nahr el-Bared reconstruction, even by 2012 
this arrangement had had not been formalized in a memo-
randum of understanding between the government and the 
agency.101 Also unresolved was UNRWAs post-reconstruction 
role in a camp built by donor money on expropriated land.102 
By March 2018, UNRWA had received US$238 million and esti-
mated that reconstruction could be completed in two years if 
the remaining funding was secured.103 However, withdrawal 
of U.S. funding to UNRWA in August 2018 and the loss of 
one-third of its budget could further delay reconstruction 
of Nahr al-Bared, despite the agency’s efforts to compensate 
for the loss.104
Conclusion 
The Nahr al-Bared refugee camp was destroyed and its popu-
lace displaced in one of the largest internal battles in post–
civil war Lebanon. The army’s victory was achieved at very 
high human costs and at the expense of the displaced refu-
gees. In this article I have argued that the destruction of the 
camp laid the foundations for its contested reconstruction 
and illustrates the obstacles to urban planning and recon-
struction in a militarized “space of exception.” The piecemeal 
reconstruction was subject to army dictates, which influ-
enced the new camp’s layout (access roads), construction 
technique (slab foundation), and design principles (maxi-
mum height, facades), and introduced new governance and 
security regimes vested with the army (community policing). 
The design for the new camp was a milestone in the par-
ticipatory planning of a refugee camp, but the contractor-
driven reconstruction faced many obstacles—financial, 
bureaucratic, governmental—meaning that delays were 
inevitable. The 2006 July War reconstruction used owner-
driven and contractor-driven approaches in South Lebanon 
and Beirut respectively, but the Nahr al-Bared reconstruc-
tion relied solely on the latter. A mixed or hybrid approach, 
combining the two,105 could have sped up reconstruction of 
Nahr el-Bared, but judicial, political, and security concerns 
prevented this from being an option. Stewarding reconstruc-
tion on behalf of the displaced refugees pitted UNRWA against 
the army, doubling as a conflict actor and urban planner. 
Because of the contested nature of the camp’s destruction 
and fear of upstaging the consensus on “non-settlement” of 
refugees, UNRWA could neither steer the camp’s reconstruc-
tion outside bureaucratic channels nor disregard state direc-
tives in the manner of powerful patrons-cum-planners such 
as Hizbollah. UNRWA—a humanitarian agency dependent 
on donations and chronically underfunded—juggled close 
to thirty reconstruction donors, with about one-third donat-
ing less than one million dollars. Handling the large num-
ber of donors was time-consuming and more so, because 
most avoided channelling funds through the multi-donor 
trust fund, which added to the stakeholder bureaucracy, as 
did managing funds for emergency relief to the displaced 
refugees. Together this overwhelmed UNRWA’s capacity and 
mandate.
The widespread housing informality added another layer 
of complexity for UNRWA, having to sort out ownership 
and rehouse refugees on a smaller area. Indeed, rehousing 
residents in smaller apartments violated UNRWA’s camp 
improvement policy of “rebuilding what was lost,” although 
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